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Abstract
We seek to better understand the scheduling of activities in time through a
dynamic model of commuting with congestion, in which workers care solely about
leisure and consumption. Implicit preferences for the timing of the commute form
endogenously due to concave preferences and temporal agglomeration economies.
Equilibrium exists uniquely and is indistinguishable from that of a generalized
version of the classical Vickrey bottleneck model, based on exogenous trip-timing
preferences; but optimal policies differ: the Vickrey model will under-predict the
benefits of congestion pricing, and such pricing may make people better off even
without considering the use of revenues.
Keywords: urban congestion; agglomeration; endogenous preferences; schedul-
ing preferences; bottleneck
JEL codes: D11, R41
1 Introduction
The scheduling of people’s activities determines many economic actions and in-
vestment needs. In particular, the tendency towards wanting to do similar things at
the same time results in many significant expenses, for example large sports stadia,
concert halls, and convention centers. This synchronization, along with a desire
for spacious residential surroundings, also requires expensive peak-capacity com-
munications links and traffic arteries in order to enable people to communicate or
congregate simultaneously.
Yet standard economic tools do not deal well with these phenomena because
they typically involve some sort of increasing returns to scale for activities at a
given location, as elegantly explained by Starrett (1974) and Krugman (1991).
These and other authors have developed the consequences of such spatial "ag-
glomeration economies", showing how they produce product differentiation (in-
volving scale economies for a given product variety), pecuniary externalities (by
which one firm’s competitive action or one consumer’s preferences affect others’
ability to reap scale economies), and spatial concentration.
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Similarly, the advantages of concentrating many individuals’ and firms’ ac-
tivities in time seem likely to create new phenomena. In particular, congestion
in transportation results because the demands for moving people and goods are
agglomerated in space and time. Thus understanding it requires being able to
model explicitly how those demands and the congestion resulting from them are
simultaneously determined.
Of the two types of agglomeration, the spatial type is much better understood
(see e.g. Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). Researchers have learned much about the
strength of spatially agglomerating forces such as labor market pooling, knowl-
edge transmission, and building of trust — each at a variety of geographical levels
including regions, metropolitan areas, urban subcenters, and even small industrial
districts.1 In some cases, explicit models can be solved to explain complex equi-
librium spatial patterns, such as those studied by Fujita and Ogawa (1982) and
Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) concerning the internal structure of metropol-
itan areas. Most of this work is concerned with productivity at the workplace.
Some, such as Glaeser et al. (2001), also consider the value of a location to con-
sumers.
Temporal agglomeration, by contrast, has elicited a much sparser literature.
Henderson (1981) shows that if workers are more productive when large numbers
are at work simultaneously, and wages reflect those productivity differences, then
workers are induced to find an equilibrium that produces temporal clustering and
hence traffic congestion. Wilson (1988) provides supporting empirical evidence.2
Vovsha and Bradley (2004) show empirically that the timing of work trips involves
preferences related both to the workplace and to the home: an example of the
latter is an aversion to departing from home too early in the day or returning too
late. Thus, in addition to the strong support for workplace agglomeration based
on productivity, there is some evidence that people also care about the timing of
their activities at home.
1See for example Chinitz (1961) and Scott (1988) on central business districts; Anas and Kim
(1996) and Helsley and Sullivan (1991) on urban subcenters; Glaeser and Gottlieb (2009) on
metropolitan areas; and Krugman (1991) on regions.
2Arnott (2007) reviews these papers and further applications, while adding his own innovation
(still within a static framework) by allowing aggregate labor supplied to be affected by congestion
tolls via a reduction in the net wage. Gutierrez-i Puigarnau and Van Ommeren (2012), on the other
hand, present evidence suggesting that the relationship may be weak empiricaly.
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However, there has been only limited success with modeling the simultaneous
formation of these scheduling preferences and of congestion. The problem is
difficult because it is inherently dynamic as well as nonlinear. As an example
of the difficulties encountered, Henderson (1981) derives an equilibrium pattern
from his model of workplace productivity, but he is forced to assume travel times
are determined in a way that allows for overtaking of earlier vehicles by ones
departing later. Small and Chu (2003) derive an equilibrium congestion pattern
in a dense downtown street network, but are forced to make a different unrealistic
assumption, namely that travel time is determined solely by traffic density at the
end of the trip.
The most successful theoretical models of equilibrium temporal aggregation
rely instead on exogenous scheduling preferences. Vickrey (1969) and many suc-
cessors such as Arnott et al. (1990, 1993) assume that each worker has a predeter-
mined preferred work arrival time and suffers disutility from deviating from that
time. These papers describe congestion as a deterministic queue behind a bottle-
neck, and this description has enabled them to shed light on numerous questions
including the effects of heterogeneous users, parallel and serial routes, and various
pricing and investment strategies. For useful reviews, see Arnott et al. (1998) or
Small and Verhoef (2007).
This paper returns to the problem of understanding the origin of scheduling
preferences. We address agglomeration in time not only in the workplace but
also at another location, here described as “home,” where non-work activities
(“leisure”) take place. The result is a firmer microfoundation for the demand for
travel, based on a few simple technological relationships along with the assump-
tion that people choose schedules to maximize their combined utility of work and
leisure. We are able to show that equilibrium exists and explore its properties.
We do so by making strong simplifying assumptions about the nature of the
agglomerative forces and of the travel network connecting the locations where
they occur. First, we ignore heterogeneity in order to highlight the role of endoge-
nous preferences. Thus we rule out certain empirically observed phenomena, such
as people commuting completely outside the normal peak hours and occupations
requiring multiple shifts.
Second, we assume that worker productivity increases with the number of
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people simultaneously at work, and that utility from leisure similarly increases
with the number of people simultaneously at the non-work location. We show
that these assumptions produce temporal clustering of both work and leisure, with
congested travel connecting them.The assumption about workers is conventional:
for example, Henderson (1981) notes that "[w]hite collar jobs involve extensive
communications and interactions with corresponding people in opposing or com-
plementary firms. The larger the mass of people at work [at a given time] the
greater will be their individual productivity." This argument applies within firms,
whose very existence supposes a need for close intra-firm coordination, and also
between firms to the extent that a firm’s success requires interaction with other
firms. For example, efficient trading of securities may require a single set of
opening hours for a stock exchange. As another, families with children are con-
strained by the opening hours of child care institutions and schools, which are
in turn determined in response to normal working hours, providing an additional
mechanism through which workers are more productive (net of child care costs)
when working simultaneously. As these examples illustrate, some population-
wide agglomeration economies are likely to remain even after various subgroups
adopt coordinating measures, such as work-hour conventions, that reduce them.3
In the spatial dimension, such scale economies have been measured empiri-
cally and are of sufficient magnitude that they are thought by most urban econo-
mists to underlie the formation of cities and especially of central business dis-
tricts.4 In the temporal dimension, the willingness of firms and workers to oper-
ate at hours requiring commuting during peak-hour traffic congestion implies that
temporal agglomeration is important, and Wilson (1988) confirms empirically that
wages vary with work hours as such temporal agglomeration would imply.
Our arguments for supposing an agglomeration effect related to leisure are
basically the same, although there is less empirical evidence regarding its mag-
nitude. Numerous leisure activities require simultaneous participation: e.g. tele-
phone calls, family meals, social events, sports, online games. If more people are
off work at a given time, then there are fewer constraints limiting the formation
3We thank a referee for some of the examples in this paragraph.
4A classic statement is by Chinitz (1961). Duranton and Puga (2004) provide a thorough
modern examination of the sources and effects of urban agglomeration economies.
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of such activities, even when they involve only a few people. Just as with work
agglomeration, conscious coordination can facilitate such simultaneous participa-
tion, but at a cost that varies inversely with the temporal density of available peo-
ple. And some such activities cannot easily be coordinated, indeed some thrive on
spontaneity. For example, many high-rent urban residential districts attract people
who seek an active social life filled with busy bars, night clubs, streets, and the-
aters, all of which require a high spatial and temporal density of clients. Empirical
studies, e.g. Glaeser et al. (2001), have found that the kinds of urban amenities
fostered by high density attract residents to a given metropolitan area; and Tabuchi
and Yoshida (2000) find consumption agglomeration economies to be of compa-
rable magnitude to workplace agglomeration economies. The likelihood that such
agglomeration forces in leisure are temporal as well as spatial has led researchers
to posit a time-varying utility of time spent at home (e.g. Vickrey (1973), Tseng
and Verhoef (2008)), the most likely explanation for which is the possibilities for
interacting with other people who are also not at work.
We carry out a detailed comparison of our results with those of the most sim-
ilar model using exogenous preferences, namely Vickrey (1973). That paper in
turn is similar in spirit to, but somewhat more general than, the more common
“bottleneck model” of Vickrey (1969). It turns out that in our model, scheduling
preferences of the kind assumed by Vickrey (1973) arise endogenously in equilib-
rium. That is, an individual taking as given the equilibrium pattern of departures
from home, as well as work and leisure productivities, will appear to behave ac-
cording to scheduling preferences in the form of a utility function that depends on
when the commute starts and ends. The scheduling preferences of Vickrey (1973)
belong to a general class that, as far as we are aware, comprises all specifications
considered by Vickrey and later authors in the context of the bottleneck model.5
We derive some properties of Nash equilibrium for this general class, in order to
compare its predictions to those of our model. This allows us to evaluate and in
some cases sign the errors that result if policies aimed at regulating congestion are
developed assuming (incorrectly) that scheduling preferences are exogenous.
In order to make our analysis tractable, we restrict it to the case where con-
5Actually the "bottleneck model" is a limiting case of the more general model, but one that is
easy to handle analytically.
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sumers are homogeneous. Actually Vickrey’s 1969 paper allowed commuters to
have different preferred arrival times, as does Newell (1987). Other papers al-
low for heterogeneity in the parameters of users’ travel-cost function (Hendrick-
son and Kocur (1981); Cohen (1987); Lindsey (2004); van den Berg and Verhoef
(2011)). Heterogeneity clearly leads to interesting results and greater realism,
at the cost of a rapid increase in model complexity; we hope our model can be
extended in this way in the future.
We find that the assumption of exogenous scheduling preferences would lead
an analyst to underestimate the benefit of congestion tolling. Using numerical
simulations, we also find that in most cases, such an analyst would underestimate
the direct benefits to travelers (not counting toll revenues); this means that people
can in fact be made better off by pricing, even when not accounting for how toll
revenues are used. This suggests that one key to gaining acceptance of conges-
tion pricing might be to explain intuitively how it would help people achieve the
benefits of agglomeration at work and home.
Humans are social animals and so it is entirely natural that the scheduling
preferences of one individual should depend on the scheduling choices of oth-
ers. Indeed, traffic congestion may be viewed as an example of the many social
interactions that shape economic behavior (Manski, 2000). In our model the in-
teraction occurs roughly at the level of a city, but there are many smaller-scale
interactions that may also lead to situations where people trade off a desire to be
together against resource barriers to doing so. For example, one could consider
the problem of arranging appointments within small groups of people who com-
pete with other groups for meeting space: their apparent preferences over meeting
schedules might arise from factors similar to those analyzed here.
2 Model with endogenous scheduling preferences
We consider a continuum of N homogenous workers. Utility is a differentiable
and strictly increasing function of "effective leisure" H produced at home and
of consumption Z, which is equal to "output" W produced at work, with the in-
terpretation that work output is exchanged for consumption at a constant price
normalized to one. When there is no toll to be subtracted from consumption, util-
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ity is thus simply U (H;W ) :We impose the following conditions on the utility
function:
Condition 1 U (H;W )!  1 as either H ! 0 or W ! 0.
Condition 2 If Ha < Hb and Wa > Wb, then
UH (Ha;Wa)
UW (Ha;Wa)
>
UH (Hb;Wb)
UW (Hb;Wb)
:
Condition 1 is needed only to rule out the extreme outcomesH = 0 orW = 0;
a weaker and quite realistic version would suffice but at some cost of complexity.6
Condition 2 will ensure that Nash equilibrium is unique. It states that the mar-
ginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption decreases as leisure
increases and consumption decreases; together with assumptions that utility is
strictly increasing and differentiable, this condition implies strict concavity of the
utility function.
We now describe agglomeration. Let [0;
] denote the available time inter-
val defining the morning. Worker productivity (aggregate output per worker per
unit time) at any time t is positively related to the number of workers at work
at that time. Since we are not trying to analyze the productivity effects of ab-
solute city size, we will take agglomeration to depend on the share of work-
ers who are at work at time s, NW (s) =N , through an agglomeration function
gW (). That is, each worker who is at work at time s produces output at rate
w(s)  gW [NW (s)=N ] : We assume gW is differentiable (hence continuous) and
increasing. A worker who arrives at work at time a produces total output
W (a) =
Z 

a
w (s) ds: (1)
We assume gW (0) = 0, which implies that no production takes place when
a single (mass zero) worker is alone at work. This is a strong assumption but
6Specifically, this condition can be replaced by requiring that both U(0;W ) and U(H; 0) are
less than U(H;W ) whenever H;W > 0.
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maintained for reasons of analytical tractability; we discuss relaxing it in the Con-
clusion. Without loss of generality, we normalize gW (1) = 1:
Similarly, effective leisure is produced in a social context, with an increasing
and differentiable agglomeration function gH (), where NH (s) is the number of
people at home at time s. Effective leisure for a worker is produced at time s at
rate h(s)  gH [NH(s)=N ], so that a worker who remains at home until time t
produces effective leisure
H (t) =
Z t
0
h (s) ds: (2)
We assume gH (0) = 0 and normalize gH (1) = 1. Leisure can be interpreted as
home production subject to agglomeration economies.
For later convenience, we define the cumulative agglomeration functionsGW (z) R z
0
gW (x) dx and GH (z) 
R z
0
gH (x) dx. Our definitions and normalizing as-
sumptions imply that 0 < GH (1) < 1 and 0 < GW (1) < 1.
We are interested in commuting between home and work. Given the symmetry
with which we model effective leisure and output, it should not matter whether we
consider the trip to or from work; for simplicity we consider just the first.7 Thus
we require each worker to start the morning at home and end it at work. Travel
between home and work occurs through a one-way bottleneck with a capacity
of  workers per time unit. Travel time required before or after the bottleneck
is identical for everyone at a constant value, which we normalize to zero. This
normalization comes at no loss of generality so long as there is sufficient capacity
for everyone to complete their travel by the end of the morning and still have
time left over for leisure and work; thus we assume  
 > N . The queueing
technology is as described by Vickrey (1969): A bottleneck is served at the rate  
and a vertical queue (i.e., one whose physical extent can be ignored) with first-in-
first-out queue discipline builds up whenever travelers arrive at the bottleneck at a
rate faster than  .
7We make no assumptions about when a given worker would return home. Notice we put no
structure on the model that would cause an interdependence between the times at which the trip to
work and the return home are undertaken; thus, if we were to model the latter, it would be a mirror
image of the trip to work.
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At any time t, the numbers of workers at home, traveling, and at work are
NH (t) ; NT (t), andNW (t), respectively, such thatNH (t)+NT (t)+NW (t) = N
for all t 2 [0;
]: Each worker remains at work until time 
.
2.1 Nash equilibrium
Nash equilibrium occurs when no worker can gain from a unilateral change of de-
parture time. With identical workers, this translates into the condition that utility
achieved by choosing a given departure time is constant over the set of those times
when departures actually occur, and that utility would be smaller for a departure
time outside this set.
Workers depart from home (and arrive at the bottleneck) during an endoge-
nously determined interval [t0; t1]. We will make use of the relative departure
time, td = t   t0. Let (tdjt0) be the departure rate from home at time t0 + td,
so that the cumulative number of departures is R (tdjt0) 
R td
0
 (sjt0) ds. The
following lemma establishes the basic characteristics of the payoff functions the
individual traveler faces as he chooses a departure time. (All proofs are given in
appendix A.)
Lemma 1 Suppose departures take place during an interval I = [t0; t1]  [0;
],
where t1 = t0 + N= , and where there is a queue for all t 2 int (I). Then the
rate of arrivals at work is  during interval I and zero elsewhere. For a worker
choosing departure time t, effective leisure is
H (t) =
(
t if t < t0
t0 +
R t t0
0
gH

1  R(tdjt0)
N

dtd if t  t0
(3)
which is (weakly) increasing and concave in t; and output at work is
W (a) =
8>><>>:

  t0   N + N GW (1) if a < t0

  t0   N + N 
h
GW (1) GW

 (a t0)
N
i
if t0  a  t1

  a if a > t1
(4)
which is (weakly) decreasing and concave in a. These properties are strict for t
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and a in the open interval (t0; t1).
R(td|t0)/
N/t0
t0 t1
td
N/
t a0
Number of people
N
R(td|t0)
NW
NH R
Figure 1: Cumulative departures (R), and number of workers at home (NH) and
at work (NW )
Lemma 1 may be visualized through Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the num-
ber of workers at home and at work as a function of time, along with cumulative
departures (the concave curve in the figure). Figure 2 depicts the resulting accu-
mulation of work and leisure for a traveler who chooses to depart at some time t 2
[t0; t1]. Effective leisure accumulates at rate h(s) = gH [1 R (s  t0jt0) =N ],
starting at time s = t0 and continuing until s = t (or until all other travelers have
departed, if earlier). Work output accumulates at ratew(s) = gW [  (s  t0)=N ],
starting at time s = awhen the traveler arrives (or the time the first other person ar-
rives, if later) and continuing until the end of the morning, s = 
. The area under
w(s) between times t0 and t1 is
R t1
t0
gW (  (s  t0)=N) ds = (N= )GW (1); that
between times t0 and a is
R a
t0
gW (  (s  t0)=N) ds = (N= )GW [  (a  t0) =N ].
The former area gives the value of W accumulated during time interval [t0; t1] for
someone who arrives at work before or at t0, while the difference between the two
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t0 t1t a
Rate of production
h(s) w(s)
H(t) W(t)
0
R(td|t0)/
N/t0
td
N/
Figure 2: Instantaneous rates of production (curves h,w) and total production for
worker departing at time t (areas H;W )
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areas gives that value for someone arriving at a time a > t0 such as shown in the
figure. In both cases, this person also receives a contribution to W equal to the
rectangle to the right of t1: that is, 
  t0  N= .
The following theorem establishes key properties of equilibrium. In particular,
it establishes that the departure interval has duration just long enough to allow
the bottleneck to deliver all N workers to their destinations, and that it begins
at a unique point in time that allows utility to be equalized for the first and last
travelers.
Theorem 1 (Nash equilibrium). Nash equilibrium exists uniquely. In Nash equi-
librium, departures and arrivals take place during an interval I = [t0; t1] 
(0;
) satisfying
t1 = t0 +N= : (5)
Utility is constant on this interval and in particular is equal at the end points:
U [H (t0) ;W (t0)] = U [H (t1) ;W (t1)] : (6)
The departure scheduleR (jt0) is strictly concave on [0; N= ] and there is always
a strictly positive queue on the interior of this interval.
The cumulative departure rate is determined by the fact that Nash equilibrium
requires workers to be indifferent among all active departure times. The extreme
undesirability of either zero output or zero effective leisure, assumed in Condition
1, bounds I away from the ends of the available day. There must be a queue
throughout this interval except at its extreme limits, since otherwise commuters
suffering a queue would switch to a nearby time with no such queue. There is no
residual queue at the end of the departure interval, since otherwise the last person
to depart could postpone departure slightly and gain utility. The uniqueness of the
equilibrium is ensured by Condition 2.
While our conditions fully determine the location of the departure interval
I within [0;
], our defined "day", its location in clock time is unspecified here
because the clock times we have labeled 0 and 
 are arbitrary. In other words,
our model does not specify whether people view home production as starting at
5:00 a.m., 6:00 a.m., or some other time. This extra degree of freedom does not
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interfere with our results, but if one wanted to explain the actual clock times of
rush hours one would need to add some absolute preference over clock times. It
seems likely that the most important such preference is that the "day" be roughly
centered around hours of natural sunlight, since we observe in cities everywhere
that the most common work hours occur during such hours. Alternatively, one
could assume that worker productivity is highest during times of sunlight. Other
possible factors explaining clock times include cultural preferences (perhaps not
very stable) and coordination with activities in other cities. The latter would tend
to cause cities on the edge of a time zone to have an imperfect correspondence
between work and daylight – Chicago, Boston, and all of Spain come to mind as
examples since they are all located where the sun is highest well before or after
12:00 noon as measured by their time zone.
3 Model with exogenous scheduling preferences
For comparison, we now describe a more conventional model where scheduling
choices arise from fixed scheduling preferences – that is, preferences that are func-
tions of clock time. Such preferences have typically been constructed around an
assumed ideal work start time, with utility penalties for arriving earlier or later
than that time. Occasionally, such preferences have instead been built from an as-
sumed schedule giving instantaneous rates of accumulation of utility as functions
of clock time. Here, we introduce a generalized version that incorporates either
of these motivations. The key point is that preferences are defined in terms of
specific times of day. In this section, we derive properties of this model; in the
next section, we contrast them with our model of endogenous scheduling.
Let each person’s utility be a function V (t; a) of departure and arrival times,
and let this function be strictly concave, increasing in t, and decreasing in a.
Defining eV (t) = V (t; t) as the utility achived by someone suffering no queueing
delay, assume that eV (t) attains a maximum at some value of t. In other words,
there is something exogenous generating a peaked preference for particular clock
times for travel. Again we assume N identical users and a deterministic bottle-
neck with capacity  , and we consider Nash equilibrium in departure times. We
call this model "the general Vickrey model".
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In one special case, V () is derived as the integral of instantaneous utility
rates vH(t) and vW (t) for time spent at home and work, respectively; see Vickrey
(1973), Tseng and Verhoef (2008), and Fosgerau and Engelson (2011). In another
case, actually a limiting case since V is now concave but not strictly so, V (t; a) is
linear in (a  t) with slope  , with  interpreted as unit disutility of travel time;
and it is also piecewise linear in a in two segments with slopes  and  , with
 and  interpreted as unit disutilities of early or late arrival. See Vickrey (1969)
and Arnott et al. (1993); this is sometimes called the "bottleneck model" or the
"; , model".8
In the next theorem, we establish properties of the general Vickrey model that
parallel those of our model as given in Theorem 1. We also state some additional
results, which generalize results already known for the "bottleneck model".
The next theorem considers tolls that, following convention, are subtracted
from the utility V . In the literature following Vickrey, utility would be inter-
preted as being in monetary units with the understanding that the complete utility
function also contains an additive term equal to the consumption of the numeraire
good.9 This interpretation would, however, create a problem when we later discuss
our endogenous scheduling model from the perspective of the general Vickrey
model, since numeraire consumption interacts explicitly with scheduling through
W in the endogenous scheduling model. We will instead interpret a toll that is sub-
tracted from utility as being, simply, in utility units and we will call this a "utility
toll". At the same time we define an equivalent money toll as the corresponding
equivalent variation (we make this definition formal in the next section).
Theorem 2 (Properties of the general Vickrey model).
(a) In the general Vickrey bottleneck model described by utility V (t; a), Nash
equilibrium occurs when departures and arrivals take place during the interval
8Vickrey (1973) showed that his specification of scheduling utility in terms of utility rates is
consistent with the more conventional ; ;  utility specification. However we have restricted
the Vickrey model slightly by requiring strict concavity, so that the ; ;  utility specification is
a limiting case rather than a special case of our "general" Vickrey model.Vickrey did not derive
equilibria for his more general model, but only for the ; ;  version.
9Vickrey (1973) calls his special case of V (t; a) "value", thus enabling him to subtract money
costs and tolls in determining welfare.
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[t0; t1] determined uniquely by (5) and by
eV (t0) = eV (t1) (7)
where eV (t)  V (t; t) is "undelayed utility," i.e. utility implied by a given sched-
ule if there were no delays. We write this equilibrium utility level, which is a
function of  , as e = e( ) = eV [t0( )] : (8)
(b) The marginal utility gain from a capacity improvement is
@ e
@ 
=  N
 2
eV 0 (t0) eV 0 (t1)eV 0 (t0)  eV 0 (t1) > 0: (9)
(c) An optimal utility toll schedule e (t) satisfies
eV (t)  e (t) = eV (t0)  e (t0) 8t 2 [t0; t1] : (10)
One such toll schedule also has e (t0) = 0; in which case everyone receives the
same utility (before any revenue distribution) as without the toll.
(d) The welfare gain from the toll schedule with e (t0) = 0 described in part
(c) is equal to the toll revenue (again in utility units), namely
 
Z t1
t0
eV (t)  e dt: (11)
The intuition behind parts (a), (c), and (d) of the theorem is straightforward
and well known within the special case usually called the "bottleneck model"
(Arnott et al., 1993). Equilibrium implies that departures take place during an
interval that is just long enough to allow all workers to pass the bottleneck; other-
wise, someone could reduce scheduling cost without increasing queuing cost. The
first and last commuters do not queue, since otherwise they could change depar-
ture time and thereby reduce their travel costs. This condition determines the start
and end times of the departure interval, as a function of the utility eV of those two
commuters. For those in the interior of the departure interval, whose scheduling
costs are smaller, utility is equalized by the existence of queuing costs, a condi-
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tion that in turn determines the departure rates needed to generate those queueing
costs. From each individual’s point of view, the motivation for departing at a
time that yields positive scheduling costs is to reduce queuing, and the motiva-
tion for accepting some queuing is to reduce scheduling cost compared to that of
the first and last commuters. The optimal toll alters departure times to prevent
queuing from emerging, so that everyone’s scheduling utility is the "undelayed"
utility eV (t). It accomplishes this by equalizing the undelayed utility minus toll
across departure times. The shape of the optimal toll is thus the same as the shape
of undelayed utility without toll. The optimal toll includes an arbitrary constante (t0); when it is set to zero, the welfare gain from tolling consists of savings in
queuing costs, which are exactly equal to the toll revenue.
4 Vickrey meets endogenous scheduling preferences
Individuals in our model have preferences defined only over leisure and consump-
tion; they care indirectly about the timing of work trips only because it affects
production at work and at home. Production is in turn affected by the scheduling
of work trips of all other individuals through the agglomeration effects specified
in our model.
However, a single individual, taking equilibrium as given, will appear to have
preferences concerning the scheduling of his commute. This section will show
that scheduling preferences like those specified in the general Vickrey model can
appear to explain individual behavior when taking the equilibrium departure pat-
tern as given, even if actual preferences are as we posit.
A naïve analyst observing an equilibrium departure pattern generated by our
model may feel justified in applying the general Vickrey model to determine the
effect of policies, since the general Vickrey model is able to generate exactly the
observed equilibrium. However, a change in capacity or some other aggregate
parameter will lead to a change in the equilibrium departure pattern and hence in
the apparent scheduling preferences. Therefore such a naïve analyst will not be
able to predict correctly the effects of a capacity change. A general result does
not seem available concerning the direction of the mistakes such an analyst would
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make.10 Concerning the optimal toll, however, we can make a more definite state-
ment: Theorem 4 shows that the naïve analyst would underestimate the welfare
gain available from this toll.
Consider an individual in our endogenous scheduling model who, in Nash
equilibrium, departs from home at time t  t0 and arrives at work at time a  t1.
Inserting the appropriate portions of (3) and (4) into utility U(H;W ) shows that
utility achieved is
V (t; a) = U
24 t0 + R t t00 gH 1  R(sjt0)N  ds;

  t0   N 
h
1 GW (1) +GW

 (a t0)
N
i 35 : (12)
We now consider the behavior of such an individual who regards the cumulative
departure pattern R(jt0) as exogenous.
Theorem 3 Consider a single individual who is part of a Nash Equilibrium in
our endogenous scheduling model. If this individual takes the cumulative depar-
ture pattern as exogenous, he or she would act according to a utility function
(12), valid for all t and a in the open interval (t0; t1). This function meets the
requirements of the general Vickrey model.
We now consider optimal tolling in the endogenous scheduling model. In this
model, numeraire consumption arises from productionW , rather than being added
onto the scheduling utility ad hoc. Given values of H and W , we can translate a
"utility toll"  payment into a corresponding to money toll payment T through
 = U (H;W )  U (H;W   T ) ; (13)
and a solution exists uniquely since the last term is monotonically strictly decreas-
ing in T . Given profiles H (t) and W (t), once we have computed the utility toll
schedule  (t) we can solve (13) to find T (t).
We must also consider what we mean by optimality. Any redistribution scheme
for toll revenues would alter the balance of marginal utilities of work and leisure
10The numerical examples in the next section show situations where the general Vickrey model
would lead to underestimates of the benefit of capacity expansion compared to the true model. We
have not been able to find conditions under which such underestimation would always occur.
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and hence affect the equilibrium. In general, then, it is difficult or perhaps im-
possible to determine a toll that maximizes utility including a redistribution of
revenues. We avoid the issue by considering a situation where toll revenues ac-
crue to an outside party which has some social value, so social welfare can be
written as
! = ! (U; Y )
where U is average utility and Y is aggregate toll revenues. We assume both
derivatives of ! are positive, and that the derivative with respect to toll revenue is
not so large as to make it optimal to extract revenue by setting tolls at a level that
would leave capacity less than fully utilized during the commute.
We are now able to provide a strong result about the effect of the optimal toll
in the true model compared to what a naïve analyst would predict.
Theorem 4 (Optimal toll) Suppose the untolled equilibrium results in travel dur-
ing interval [t0; t1], so that the Vickrey model predicts an optimal toll that is zero
at t0 and t1 and positive elsewhere on [t0; t1]. Under endogenous scheduling pref-
erences:
(a) The following utility toll produces a larger welfare gain than the maximum
possible gain predicted by the general Vickrey model:
^(t) = V^ (t; t)  eV (t0; t0) (14)
where eV () is the Vickrey utility calculated from the observed untolled equilib-
rium, and V^ () is the true utility when travelers depart at rate  starting at t0.
This toll is larger than the Vickrey toll on (t0; t1].
(b) The optimal toll produces a welfare gain that is at least as large as that
from the toll given in (14).
Part (b) of the theorem follows directly from part (a). The proof of the theo-
rem (Appendix A) considers the toll (14), which in our setup is not optimal but
is an improvement over the Vickrey toll. It removes queueing (in the true model)
while maintaining the first equilibrium departure time to be the same as in the
equilibrium solution to the Vickrey model. This toll is larger than in the Vickrey
model because it takes into account that workers depart later than in Nash equilib-
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rium and therefore that agglomeration leads to a higher production of leisure. The
agglomeration effect is not present in the Vickrey model and hence the Vickrey
model predicts a smaller efficiency gain. This toll is not optimal because it does
not re-optimize the initial departure time t0. The finding that the toll that removes
congestion in the true model is larger than in the Vickrey model model implies
also that the Vickrey toll (10) would fail to remove all congestion (in contrast to
its intent).
We have not found an analytical solution for the fully optimal toll. We conjec-
ture that if one exists, it contains terms related to the Pigou subsidies correcting
the positive externalities of agglomeration, integrated over the period of travel. In
the numerical example in the next section, we determine the optimal toll numeri-
cally and find that in contrast to the Vickrey toll, it can shift the first departure time
t0 substantially from its value in the untolled equilibrium. Thus, it appears that ag-
glomeration effects may create a potential for substantial efficiency improvements
beyond those from eliminating queueing.
We now consider the marginal benefits (in terms of utility) from adding ca-
pacity. It will be convenient to introduce the following notation for utilities and
marginal utilities (with respect to the arguments of the utility functions) for the
first and last travelers, given that the first departs at time t0.
Notation 1
U 0 = U

t0;
  t0   N
 
+
N
 
GW (1)

U 1 = U
"
t0 +
Z N
 
0
gH

1  R (sjt0)
N

ds;
  t0   N
 
#
(15)
U0H = UH

t0;
  t0   N
 
+
N
 
GW (1)

The derivatives U1H ; U0W ; and U1W are defined similarly.
Lemma 2 Suppose the true model is our model of endogenous scheduling prefer-
ences. Then
(a) The generalized Vickrey utilities for the first and last traveler vary with t0
according to eV 0 (t0) = U0H and eV 0 (t1) =  U1W ;
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(b) Interpreting the equilibrium as coming from the general Vickrey model,
utility would be thought to vary with capacity according to:
@ e
@ 
=
N
 2
 U
0
HU
1
W
U0H + U
1
W
; (16)
(c) The true variation of utility with capacity expansion is:
@
@ 
=
 
U0H   U0W
 @t0
@ 
+ U0W
N
 2
[1 GW (1)] . (17)
Equation (17) states that the marginal utility of capacity arises from two sources:
(i) the utility change to the first traveler from production and leisure as t0 is shifted,
and (ii) the change in production for the first traveler due to more people being
at work at each time after t0. These marginal values of capacity expansion are
calculated numerically in the next section.
5 Numerical example
In this section we illustrate the workings of the model by solving it for particular
functional forms and parameter values. Mostly we use this tool to explore how
the model behaves under quite wide variations in parameters, in order to depict
the range of its possibilities for explaining various observable patterns. Thus the
first five simulations portray fairly extreme situations. In our last simulation, by
contrast, we calibrate so as to produce features typical of a realistic city. In each
case, we compute the full social optimum (thus going beyond the results of The-
orem 4) and we compute the extent of the errors that would occur from using the
Vickrey model for policy prescriptions if behavior is affected by agglomeration as
depicted by our model.
For our main set of runs, we set 
 = 10 (interpreted as a morning lasting
from A =2:00 a.m. to A + 
 =12:00). We set N = 2 and  = 1; thus the
congested period is exactly two hours long. (We then vary  in order to calculate
the marginal benefit of capacity.) We also take the utility function to be Cobb-
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Douglas, and the agglomeration functions to be simple power functions:
U (H;W ) =  lnH + lnW; (18)
gH(x) = x
H ; (19)
gW (x) = x
W ; (20)
with W , H > 0. We require H < 1 because otherwise, as we show in Appendix
B, our simulation yields no solution.
Given some initial departure time t0, equations (3) and (4) then give the fol-
lowing analytical expressions for effective leisure and work production for a trav-
eler departing at any time t2 [t0; t0 +N= ]:
H(t) = t0 +
Z td
0

1  R (t
0jt0)
N
H
dt0
W [a(t)] = 
  t0   1
 
 
W +R (tdjt0)W+1
W + 1
!
;
where td = t   t0, and where a(t) = t0 + R (tdjt0) = is the arrival time of thi
traveler. If we substitute these expressions into the utility function in (18), we get
utility as a function of departure time, which we write as eU(t).
Our problem is twofold: (a) to find the cumulative departure function
R (tdjt0) that makes eU(t) constant; and (b) to find the initial departure time t0
that ensures everyone travels, i.e. R [(N= ) jt0] = 1. Task (a) is accomplished by
setting the total derivative of eU(t) equal to zero, yielding:

H(t)
[1 R ()]H   1
W [a(t)]
R ()W  ()
 
= 0
where () is shorthand for (t  t0jt0), and  is the derivative of R: We can rewrite
this condition as
 () =  W [a (t)]
H(t)
[1 R ()]H
R ()W : (21)
Since  = R0, this is a differential equation inR, which can be solved numerically
given a value of t0.
For task (b), an outer iterative procedure is employed to find the unique value
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Table 1: Simulation results
Simulation number 1 2 3 4 5 6
Parameters:
Time universe
(Hours past midnight) 2-12 2-12 2-12 2-12 2-12 0-12
alpha 1 1 1 1 0.5 2
H 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.1
W 0.5 1 3 0.5 0.5 0.1
N= (duration of peak hours) 2 2 2 2 2 2
Nash equilibrium:
(1) t0 (hours past midnight) 4.95 5.28 6.08 3.64 3.64 6.85
(2) td at max travel time 5.57 5.79 6.38 4.14 4.25 7.70
(3) Max travel time (hr) 0.83 0.96 1.25 1.16 0.85 0.31
(4) Average travel time (hr) 0.56 0.64 0.79 0.74 0.58 0.21
(5) R(td = (t1   t0)=10) 0.41 0.51 0.72 0.58 0.42 0.18
(6) Vickrey/Actual dU=d 0.94 0.83 0.69 0.73 1.00 2.15
Social optimum:
(7) t0 (hours past midnight) 6.00 5.94 5.82 6.03 4.43 6.95
(8) (Umin) 0.13 0.06 -0.01 0.49 0.09 0.01
(9) Average toll 0.16 0.24 0.34 0.22 0.17 0.10
of t0 for which total cumulative departures are exactly N . More details are in
Appendix B. The value is unique because H (t) and W (t) are increasing and de-
creasing, respectively, in t0, so that  in (21) will be smaller the larger is t0; this is
discussed in the proof of unique existence of Nash equilibrium in Appendix A.
Results are shown in rows labeled (1)-(5) in Table 1. Consider simulation
#1, for which  = 1 and H = W = 1=2. The congested period extends
between times 4.95 and 6.95 in our 10-hour "morning"; thus it is shifted earlier
by 1.05 hours compared to one that is centered during the morning (which would
be from 6:00 to 8:00). Forty-one percent of travelers depart during the first twelve
minutes (row 5), resulting in congestion reaching a peak travel time of 0.83 hours.
Cumulative departures and arrivals are shown as the two left-most curves in the
top panel of Figure 3.
By varying capacity  , we can calculate numerically the derivative in equation
(17) and thus compute the marginal value of capacity in untolled equilibrium. We
compare this with the marginal value predicted by the Vickrey analysis, namely
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Figure 3: Graphs for Simulation #1
23
equation (16). Row (6) of Table 1 shows the ratio of these two calculations: we
see that the Vickrey model underpredicts benefits in most cases, but overpredicts
them when agglomeration is small (Simulation #6).11
We also compute the Vickrey toll e (t) using (10). Its two terms can be calcu-
lated, using (12) and (18), as
eV (t) =  ln [H (t)] + ln [W (a (t))]
 eV (t0) =   ln (t0)  ln
  t0   N
 
 W
W + 1

.
Recall that the Nash equilibrium departure patternR () is chosen to make eV (t1) =eV (t0); thus the Vickrey toll begins and ends at a value of zero, because the Vick-
rey analyst assumes that the first and last travelers (who avoid queueing) care only
about their schedules and therefore achieve the same utility as without the toll.
The resulting toll for simulation #1 is shown as the solid curve in the second panel
of Figure 3; it rises rapidly after time t0 and then falls more gradually from its
peak value.
Finally, in each case we have carried out a simulation of the social optimum.
It is achieved by applying the optimal toll which, like the Vickrey toll, is set to
maintain a constant departure rate  =  . In contrast to the Vickrey toll, however,
the optimal toll actually achieves this departure rate. In this calculation, t0 is set
so as to maximize the average of travelers’ gross utilities (i.e., their utilities before
paying tolls). That value is
bU (t) = max
t0
 
Z t0+1= 
t0
U
h bH (t) ;cW (t)i dt; (22)
where bH (t) is computed numerically from (3) but with R (tdjt0) =  td, and
where cW (t) is computed as before except now t0 takes a different value. Details
of calculating (22) are given in Appendix B. Since U
h bH (t) ;cW (t)i is a concave
11The more detailed calculations show that both terms in (17) are of similar size except in
Simulation #3, in which the second dominates – presumably due to the high importance of work
agglomeration in this simulation.
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function of t; it attains its minimal value bUmin at either t0 or t1; we fix the toll ^ to
be zero at this point, which implies that the ^ is non-negative at all times in [t0; t1] :
With an optimum toll, all travelers achieve the same utility, and this is equal to the
net utility (utility minus toll) of any traveler and in particular it is equal to bUmin:
We report on bUmin in our simulation results.
Rows (7)-(9) provide more results concerning the social optimum. The second
panel of Figure 3 shows the optimal money toll (for Simulation #1), which for this
example is given by the following analytical solution to (13):
T (t) = W (a (t))   1  e (t)
In Simulation #1, the optimal first departure time t0 is exactly 6.0 (6:00 a.m.),
so that the two-hour departure interval is centered in the available time universe
[2:00, 12:00]. This result reflects the symmetry of leisure and work in this sim-
ulation (since H = W and  = 1). This optimal value of t0 is substantially
later than the Nash equilibrium value of 4.95. The symmetry of this simulation
causes the optimal toll to be perfectly symmetric about the midpoint of the morn-
ing (7.00). The Vickrey starts later and reaches larger values than the optimal toll,
as seen in the second and third panels of the figure.
Simulations #2 and #3 explore successively larger values of W ;whereas sim-
ulation #4 looks at a larger value of H . Simulations #5 and #6 consider a smaller
and larger value, respectively, for .
The shape of the equilibrium departure pattern, as a function of t  t0, is gov-
erned mainly by the relative values of H and W . Smaller values result in the
least congestion and the lowest fraction of travelers who depart early in the de-
parture interval. The location of the rush hour within the available time shifts in
opposite directions depending on which agglomeration is increased: earlier for
increasing H and later for increasing W . Increasing , the weight on household
production in the utility function, makes little difference to the pattern of depar-
tures or to the amount of travel delay; but it shifts the start of the departure interval
to a later time in order to restore balance between UH and UW .
Increasing W , which controls agglomeration at work, causes two changes
(simulations #2 and #3). First, the optimal first departure time shifts earlier,
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whereas the Nash equilibrium value shifts later. In simulation #3, these oppos-
ing shifts are so strong that the socially optimal rush hour starts earlier than the
Nash equilibrium rush hour, in contrast to all other simulations. Second, the util-
ity difference for the last traveler, relative to the first, becomes positive, meaning
the optimal toll is now higher for a departure at time t1 than one at time t0 (not
shown in the table). These effects are reversed when it is H rather than W that
is raised (simulation #4). Note that in this latter simulation, the higher home ag-
glomeration parameter causes the optimal commuting interval (always two hours
in length) to occur slightly later than in the case with symmetric parameters (sim-
ulation #1), due to a greater social value of letting everyone spend time at home
together; whereas the Nash equilibrium commuting interval occurs considerably
earlier due to more congestion.
Simulations #5 changes the relative importance of work through parameter 
in the utility function. The first departure time is quite sensitive to , but remains
consistently about an hour earlier in equilibrium than in the optimum. Decreasing
 shifts first departure times earlier, allowing people to spend more time at work.
The final simulation (#6) is designed to produce a more realistic pattern of
congestion, lasting from 6:51 a.m. to 8:51 a.m. and reaching maximum conges-
tion delay of 19 minutes. We achieve this result by extending the considered time
period to 
=12 (interpreted as from midnight to noon), choosing a high value of 
so that people choose to spend longer at home, and choosing small values for ag-
glomeration parameters so that people don’t tolerate so much congestion. In this
simulation, most differences between the Vickrey and actual model are not nearly
as pronounced: first departure time differs by just six minutes, and the utility gain
from tolling differs by about ten percent. However, in this simulation the Vickrey
model drastically errs in its cost-benefit analysis of a marginal capacity increase
in the absence of a toll, overstating the true value by 115 percent as seen in row
(6).
For each simulation we calculate bUmin; the minimum gross (i.e. pre-toll) utility
obtained in social optimum. As already noted, it is the utility of the traveler who
is charged a toll of zero, which is either the first or the last traveler. The difference
between bUmin and the utility obtained by travelers in Nash equilibrium is therefore
the net (post-toll) utility gain realized by all travelers. Row (8) shows that this
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difference is positive in most cases, indicating that the optimal toll leads to a strict
Pareto improvement even if toll revenues are not returned to travelers. However,
simulation #3 shows a contrary case, where travelers will lose (very slightly) in the
social optimum, compared to Nash equilibrium, if toll revenues are not returned.
Both of these results are in contrast with the Vickrey model, which predicts zero
change in gross utility.
Figures 3-5 present graphs of the departure patterns R () and of the Vickrey
and optimal tolls, for selected simulations. In all three cases, the Vickrey toll
differs greatly from the optimal toll, though for different reasons. In simulation #3,
with high work agglomeration, the Vickrey analyst predicts the optimal departure
pattern quite closely, but is wildly off on the size and shape of the toll that will
achieve it. In simulation #4, with high leisure agglomeration, the Vickrey analyst
gets the shape of the toll roughly correct, but its magnitude is too high and its
position in time is much too early, resulting in people spending too little time at
home and thus not taking advantage of the high marginal utility of leisure time
with these parameters.
6 Conclusion
This paper has presented a dynamic model of traffic congestion in which schedul-
ing preferences arise endogenously. A naïve Vickrey-like analyst — observing
one equilibrium and assuming scheduling preferences to be exogenously given —
would find that to be in accordance with his model. But because he ignores the
positive temporal agglomeration externalities associated with being at home or at
work, this analyst will underestimate the benefits of a toll that reduces queueing
during the commute and will make potentially very large errors in predicting the
effect of policies such as capacity expansion and tolling. For some parameter sets,
such an analyst would apply a toll schedule and/or aim for a departure pattern
that is quite far removed from the optimal one. So a policy conclusion is that a
gradual approach to introducing a policy such as road pricing is advisable, since
that allows the consequences to be observed as one goes along.
The general conclusions depend on the result of ignoring an externality (ag-
glomeration) and therefore seem likely to be quite robust. Hence we may expect
27
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00P
ro
po
rti
on
 of
 tra
ve
ler
s
Clock time (hours past midnight)
Nash, Vickrey, & Optimal Solutions
Cum.
departures: Nash
eq
Cum. arrivals:
Nash eq. &
Vickrey opt.
Cum dep. &
arriv.: True
optimum
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
3.00 5.00 7.00 9.00
To
ll
Clock time (hours past midnight)
Vickrey & Optimal Tolls
Vickrey toll
Optimal toll
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
To
ll
Relative time: (t-t0)/(t1-t0)
Vickrey & Optimal Tolls (at time relative to t0)
Vickrey toll
Optimal toll
Figure 4: Graphs for Simulation #3
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that these conclusions would survive if we relax the assumptions that we have
made for the sake of analytical tractability.
We have assumed, first, that the productivity of effective leisure and work de-
pend solely on the share of workers at home and at work at each point in time. We
have furthermore assumed that a worker working alone is completely unproduc-
tive and similarly that a worker derives no effective leisure from solitary leisure
time. The essential mechanism here is the positive externality associated with
being at home or at work. As long as this remains, it seems possible to relax
assumptions regarding productivity without affecting the validity of our general
conclusions. Indeed, we found through simulations not reported here that even
with no agglomeration (i.e. effective leisure and production are not dependent on
other people), concave utility produces a unique single-peaked equilibrium.12
Second, we have made assumptions that allow us to ignore the evening com-
mute. The model describes people as staying at work until some common time
and is silent about what happens thereafter. Incorporating the evening commute
would not affect the conclusions that depend on a Vickrey-like analyst ignoring
agglomeration externalities.
Third, we have assumed that the demand for travel is completely inelastic. As
has been noted earlier, this reduces the importance of the assumption that produc-
tivity depends on the share of all workers present at home or at work. Allowing
for elastic demand would likely enable us to separate the problem into two parts,
similarly to Arnott et al. (1993), including removing the indeterminacy on the
level of the toll. However we would then have to deal explicitly with city-size
agglomeration effects.
Fourth, the paper assumes that individuals are identical. Allowing for hetero-
geneity would raise the issue of how workers sort in equilibrium, ie. in which
sequence they pass the bottleneck. The presence of heterogeneity would add a
possibility for efficiency gain from a toll that causes workers to sort in a more
efficient way. It seems likely that our general conclusions would remain valid due
to the remaining central premise that positive agglomeration externalities shape
12We also verified through simulations that if we eliminate agglomeration and make the utility
function close to being flat, congestion is essentially eliminated as people choose travel schedules
so that their departure rate exceeds capacity by only a small amount.
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scheduling preferences.
There are no firms in our model. Firms could seek to internalize agglomeration
externalities by paying a wage that depends on the time a worker arrives at the
work place (instead of the integral of the productivity rate over time spent at work,
as implicitly assumed here). It would be an interesting extension of the present
analysis to include such aspects of firm behavior, but probably also very difficult
except in the trivial case of a single firm fully internalizing the externality.
The model with endogenous scheduling preferences generates an equilibrium
that is indistinguishable from a model with exogenous scheduling preferences. It
is hence not possible to falsify the latter model using only observation of individ-
ual choices in a single equilibrium; rather, in order to identify endogeneity, it is
necessary to compare different equilibria. It may be possible to employ such an
identification strategy empirically, for example by using capacity expansion or the
introduction of a road pricing scheme as an exogenous instrument in an empirical
investigation explaining variations in the temporal shape of the morning peak.
Furthermore, by relaxing certain of these assumptions, it could become possi-
ble to test the importance of endogenous scheduling preferences empirically. For
example, suppose we relax the first assumption and allow for exogenous factors
affecting work productivity or utility from leisure time. These would form an al-
ternative explanation of peaking, and by observing variations in those factors one
could see how much differences in peaking can be explained in this way. For ex-
ample, the duration of daylight varies both by latitude within a given season, and
by season within a given location that is not close to the equator. If daylight has an
important effect, one should observe resulting variations in the extent of peaking
in commuting due to this external force acting to make scheduling preferences
exogenous.13
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Since the queue exists throughout I , and queueing time
constitutes all travel time, the queue discharge rate  is also the rate of arrivals
at work. Then for any td 2 [0; N= ] we have NH(t0 + td) = N   R (tdjt0) and
NW (t0 + td) =  td. The expression for H then follows immediately from (2);
note that it is constant for all t  t1. The expression for W follows by calculating
(1), evaluated for each of the three possible cases shown in (4).
Next, consider derivatives. First, H 0 (t) = 1 for t  t0. For t  t0, H 0 (t) =
gH

1  R(t t0jt0)
N

; which is strictly positive until time t1 and zero afterwards –
the latter because R(s  t0jt0) = N for s  t1. It is also continuous at t1 because
gH

1  R(t1 t0jt0)
N

= gH (0) = 0 by the definition of t1 and the properties of
gH (). Next, H 00(t) =  g0H

1  R(t t0jt0)
N

 (t t0jt0)
N
, from which we see H 00
< 0 for t 2 int (I) and H 00 = 0 outside I – the latter because NH is constant there
and thus so is gH .
Similarly, W 0 (a) = 0 for a < t0, W 0 (a) =  gW [  (a  t0) =N ] for a 2
I , and W 0 (a) =  1 for a > t1; note W 0 is continuous everywhere because
  (t1   t0) =N = 1 (by the definition of t1) and gW (1) = 1. Furthermore,
W 00 (a) =  ( =N)g0W [  (a  t0) =N ] < 0 for a 2 int (I) and W 00 = 0 outside
I . Because H , W , H 0, and W 0 are all continuous at the boundaries of I , and H 0
and W 0 are non-increasing there, concavity holds at these boundaries as well.
Proof of Theorem 1. We need to show that Nash equilibrium exists uniquely,
and that in Nash equilibrium the departure rate is strictly decreasing in time. Our
strategy is to write utility as a function of departure time, measured as time after
a given initial departure time, and to consider the implications of meeting a "total
population" condition that the departure rate must integrate toN , the total number
of workers over a duration of N= time units. We do this by defining a function
d (t) relating the last departure time to the first departure time so as to meet the
total population condition. We show that as t covers its allowed values, d (t) first
falls short of, then exceeds, the value N= that represents the minimum time over
which the bottleneck can deliver travelers to their destination. By continuity there
must then be at least one value of t such that d (t) = N= . We then show that
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given the properties of utility and of the production functions for leisure and work,
the departure rate must be smaller as initial departure time becomes larger, which
enables us to locate a single departure time that meets both the total population
condition and the Nash equilibrium condition.
We begin by defining abstract functions , R, and u whose properties we will
gradually restrict so that they can represent the departure rate, cumulative depar-
tures, and utility for a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1 An anchored function R (djt) is a real function defined for d  0
and t 2 [0;
], with R (0jt) = 0. It is associated with a utility profile defined as
u (djt) = U

t+
Z d
0
gH

1  R (sjt)
N

ds;
 

t+
N
 

+
1
 
Z N
R(djt)
gW
 s
N

ds

:
Note that the utility profile depends only on R () and on the utility and ag-
glomeration functions. The term "anchored" means simply that it is required to
start at zero, i.e., time t represents an initial departure.
Definition 2 A candidate cumulative departure function is an anchored function
R (jt) whose utility profile is constant:
0 =
@u (djt)
@d
= UH  gH

1  R (djt)
N

  UW  gW

R (djt)
N

 (djt)
 
; (23)
where
 (djt) = @R (djt)
@d
:
is called the candidate departure rate profile.
Remark 1 Equation (23) and the properties of U , gH , and gW , along with the
anchoring requirement that R (0jt) = 0; imply that  (jt) > 0 and
 (djt)  !
d!0+
1:
Definition 3 Given a candidate departure rate profile, a candidate departure du-
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ration d (t) is defined implicitly by the total population condition
Z d(t)
0
 (sjt) ds = N:
By continuity, Lemma 3 below ensures that there is at least one t with d (t) =
N= : Since  (jt) is decreasing by Lemma 4, R (jt) is concave. Hence R (djt) 
 d for all d 2]0; N= [: Then there will be queue from time t to time t+N= and
so u (djt) describes the evolution of utility under the departure schedule R (jt) ;
which then describes a Nash equilibrium. Thus existence of Nash equilibrium is
established.
It remains to show that Nash equilibrium is unique. Consider two Nash equi-
libria indexed by a and b; starting departures at time ta and tb; respectively, where
ta < tb. Consider then the inequalities
Ha
 
R 1 (xjta)

< Hb
 
R 1 (xjtb)

;Wa
 
R 1 (xjta)

> Wb
 
R 1 (xjtb)

: (24)
Then (24) is valid at x = 0: It follows by continuity that there exists x0 > 0 such
that (24) is valid for all x < x0: Then by Condition 2,

 
R 1 (xjta) jta

> 
 
R 1 (xjtb) jtb

for all such x: This implies that R 1 (xjta) < R 1 (xjtb) and so (24) holds also at
x = x0: This argument shows that (24) holds at all x 2 [0; 1] ; since there can be
no first x where it fails. But this is a contradiction since
N
 
=
Z N
0
1
 (R 1 (xjta) jta)dx <
Z N
0
1
 (R 1 (xjtb) jtb)dx =
N
 
:
This establishes that Nash equilibrium is unique.
Lemma 3 Conditions 1 and 2 imply that a candidate departure duration brackets
the value N= , as follows:
d (0) <
N
 
< d


  N
 

:
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Proof. Consider the first inequality and assume on the contrary that d (0)  N
 
:
Note that  (0j0) = 1; which rules out that R (dj0) <  d for all d > 0 by the
definition of  as the derivative of R. Then 9d > 0 s.t. R (dj0) =  d: There is
queue for all departures in [0; d] and so utility is constant for departures in this
interval. But H = 0 for departure at time 0 and so utility is  1 at this departure
time while utility is finite for departure at time d: This is a contradiction and we
conclude that d (0) < N
 
: Consider now the second inequality and assume on the
contrary that N
 
 d


  N
 

: This implies that there is queue for all departures
in the interval


 N= ;
 N= + d (
 N= ) and hence utility is constant
for departure times in this interval. For the last possible departure time we have
W = 0 and hence U =  1; while U is finite for the first departure time. This is
a contradiction and we conclude that N
 
< d


  N
 

as desired.
Lemma 4 Consider Nash equilibrium with first departure at time t0: Then 0 (djt0) <
0 for d 2 int (I) :
Proof. The departure rate  (djt0) satisfies
0 = UH  gH

1  R (djt0)
N

  UW  gW

R (djt0)
N

 (djt0)
 
:
Differentiate and rearrange slightly to find that
UW  gW

R (djt0)
N

0 (djt0)
 
= (UHHH
0 + UHWW 0) H 0 + (UHWH 0 + UWWW 0) W 0
 UH  g0H

1  R (djt0)
N

 (djt0)
N
  UW  g0W

R (djt0)
N

 (djt0)2
N 
:
The RHS of this equation is strictly negative since U is strictly concave and UH >
0; UW > 0: The desired conclusion follows.
Proof of Theorem 2. (a) Nash equilibrium requires equal utilities, since all
workers are identical, and thus in particular it requires (7). The proofs of existence
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and uniqueness are similar to those for our model of endogenous scheduling, and
also to those for the bottleneck model, so are omitted here.
(b) First we differentiate equation (7), using (5) for t1, to obtain:
eV 0 (t0) @t0
@ 
= eV 0 (t1)@t0
@ 
  N
 2

:
Solving,
@t0
@ 
=  N
 2
eV 0 (t1)eV 0 (t0)  eV 0 (t1) > 0:
Applying these results, we can differentiate (8) to obtain (9).
(c) The optimal toll eliminates congestion but never leaves the bottleneck de-
livering less than its full capacity until the end of the departure period. The logic
here is the same as in Arnott et al. (1993): any congestion would cause a loss of
scheduling utility without a compensating gain; but any unused capacity would
permit reallocating someone to a departure time with a higher utility. That this
toll is the one satisfying (10) can be seen by noting that with no queue, eV (t) is
the actual scheduling utility received by a traveler departing at t (in contrast to the
situation before tolling, where scheduling utility was lower because arrival a dif-
fered from departure t for all but the first and last traveler). This traveler’s utility
net of toll payment is the left-hand side of (10), which therefore states that this net
utility is constant in time, making the new departure and arrival schedule a Nash
equilibrium. In the case e (t0) = 0; (10) shows that this net utility is identical to
that received before the toll was introduced.
(d) Total welfare change for a worker is defined as the change in that worker’s
net utility, plus toll revenues received from that worker. Each worker achieves the
same utility net of toll payments as before the toll is imposed. Therefore, the net
utility change to all workers is zero, and the total welfare change is equal to total
revenues.
Proof of Theorem 3. For any t; a 2 (t0; t1), we have 0 < 1 R (t  t0jt0) =N <
1 and 0 <   (a  t0) =N < 1: We need to show that V (t; a) is increasing
in departure time t; decreasing in arrival time a; and strictly concave; and thateV (t) = V (t; t) attains a maximum. The first two statements can be shown by
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signing the derivatives of V (t; a):
V1(t; a) = UH  gH

1  R (t  t0jt0)
N

> 0 (25a)
V2(t; a) =  UW  gW

  (a  t0)
N

< 0; (25b)
where UH and UW are evaluated at H(t) and W (a). To establish concavity, we
compute the second derivatives of V :
V11 (t; a) = UHH  g2H   UH  g0H
 (t  t0jt0)
N
< 0
V22 (t; a) = UWW  g2W   UW  g0W
 
N
< 0
V12 (t; a) =  UHW  gH  gW < 0;
where the arguments of gH and gW are the same as in (25). Strict concavity of V is
equivalent to its Hessian being negative definite. That is, the following quadratic
form must be strictly negative for any real numbers x1; x2 6= 0:
x21  V11 (t; a) + 2x1x2  V12 (t; a) + x22  V22 (t; a)
= x21  UHH  g2H   x21  UH  g0H 
 (t  t0jt0)
N
 2x1x2  UHW  gH  gW
+x22  UWW  g2W   x22  UW  g0W 
 
N
< (x1  gH)2  UHH
 2 (x1  gH)  (x2  gW )  UHW
+ (x2  gW )2  UWW :
This expression is indeed strictly negative because U is strictly concave.
It remains to show that eV (t) = V (t; t) attains a maximum. This follows sinceeV inherits concavity from V and since eV (t0) = eV (t1) :
Proof of Theorem 4. A Vickrey-like analyst would set a toll schedule e (t) aimed
at maintaining a departure schedule starting at t0 which just eliminates queueing:
namely eR (sjt0) =  s. He does so by calculating this schedule based on the
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assumed scheduling utility function V (t; a) given by (12) with a = t (de Palma
and Fosgerau, 2011). This utility can be written as follows:
eV (t)  V (t; t) = U t0 + Z t t0
0
gH

1  R (sjt0)
N

ds; cW (tjt0) ; (26)
where cW (tjt0) = Z t1 t0
t t0
gW

 s
N

ds+ 
  (t0 +N= ) :
andR () follows its no-toll equilibrium path as depicted in Fig. 1. We can assume
the arbitrary toll constant would be chosen so that e (t0) = 0. The utility toll
would thus be: e (t) = eV (t)  eV (t0) ; (27)
since this would assure that the anticipated utility net of toll would be identical
for everyone under the desired departure pattern. This desired pattern, which we
denote by eR (), is the same as the line labeled NW in Figure 1.
As an intermediate step toward a truly optimal toll, consider now an analyst
who also aims to achieve departure pattern eR (), but who knows the true model.
This analyst would similarly use (27) except with eV (t) replaced by the true utility
given that departure pattern. That utility accounts for howH changes as a result of
the change in departure pattern: it is calculated as in (26) but with new cumulative
departures  s replacing the original cumulative departuresR (sjt) in the argument
of gH . Denoting the result by V^ (t), we have:
V^ (t)  U

t0 +
Z t t0
0
gH

1   s
N

ds; cW (tjt0) (28)
The utility toll b(t) would thus be set to maintain utility net of toll at its original
constant value e = eV (t0), i.e. it is given by (14). Because  s < R (sjt0) for
every value of s in the arguments of gH , the value of H (i.e., the first argument of
U [] in these equations) is greater in (28) than in (26). Therefore V^ (t) > eV (t)
and as a consequence ^(t) > e (t), for every t > t0.
Now consider the welfare gains from toll ^(t). A generalized Vickrey
analyst would believe the welfare gain to be equal to the toll revenue from e (),
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with constant departure rate  =  : that is,  
R t1
t0
e (t) dt. But we have just seen
that the congestion-removing toll that really leaves workers’ net utility unaffected,
namely ^(t), is larger than e (t), and strictly larger for t > t0. The departure rate
with that toll is again  =  , so its welfare gain (the sum of all travelers’ utilities)
is equal to toll revenue  
R t1
t0
^ (t) dt. Hence the toll revenue and welfare gain are
both strictly larger than believed by Vickrey.
Proof of Lemma 2. (a and b) From the definition of eV and eq. (12), we haveeV 0 (t0) = dV (t0; t0) =dt0 = V1 (t0; t0) + V2 (t0; t0) = U0H  gH (1)   U0W  gW (0)
= U0H . Similarly, eV 0 (t1) = V1 (t1; t1) + V2 (t1; t1) = U1H  gH (0)   U1W  gW (1)
=  U1W . Then use Theorem 2. (c) Equation (17) is obtained by differentiating
equilibrium utility U0 in (15) with respect to  :
B Numerical simulation details
B.1 Nash equilibrium
For given parameters  , , W , and H , the numerical solution proceeds by first
choosing a trial value of t0 and dividing the time axis into many small periods
starting at t0:We then compute  and R stepwise. For the first few periods, cu-
mulative departures are computed from (31) as explained below; after that they
are computed by cumulating values of departure rate ; which is computed in
each time interval from (21) using values of R, H , and W as determined in the
previous period. When R is near one, we apply (32) to find the end of the depar-
ture interval. We compare the duration of this departure interval with its required
value, N= , to determine whether the trial value of t0 is consistent with equilib-
rium; if not, we adjust t0 iteratively until the correct interval length is achieved.
This is an instance of the "shooting method".
Finally, we check the accuracy by comparing the values of U computed at
all the time periods; they should be identical, and if not we make the time steps
smaller in order to increase the accuracy of the calculation. We typically get satis-
factory results with 500 time periods, achieving identical utilities to within about
0.1 percent, and within about 0.03 percent for all but the first 10 time periods;
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we have also verified that the solution remains stable for a range of grid sizes
approaching the one we use.
The procedure for values of t near t0 or t1 is different because equation (21)
is numerically unsatisfactory there. First, the departure rate  is infinite at R = 0,
the beginning of the rush hour. Furthermore, as R approaches 1 (the end of the
departure interval),  ! 0, causing that approach to possibly occur very slowly
since R is the integral of . These extremes make a simple stepwise numerical
procedure inaccurate, so instead we calculateR in those two regions by solving an
approximate version of (21) for constant UH=UW . This is quite accurate because
H and W contain constants at the boundaries, which allows the marginal utilities
=H and 1=W to be nearly constant there. Furthermore, near the first boundary
we can approximate [1 R ()] in (21) as a constant equal to unity, and near the
second boundary we can approximate R () as a constant equal to unity. The
approximate differential equations are then
 = K0 R W near t = t0; (29)
 = K1  (1 R)H near t = t1; (30)
whereK0 =  UH(0)=UW (0) andK1 =  UH(1)=UW (1) with notation (0) and (1)
indicating values at the endpoints of the departure interval. We seek the solutions
to these differential equations, with boundary conditionsR (0jt0) = 0 for (29) and
R

N
 
jt0

= 1 for (30). The solutions are:
R = [(1 + W ) K0  (t  t0)]
1
w+1 near t = t0; (31)
1 R = [(t1   t) (1  H)K1]
1
1 h near t = t1: (32)
Note that (32) requires H < 1 to be valid, i.e. to give (1 R) as a finite real
number. Basically, this is because for larger values of H , the departure rate (30)
becomes so small as R ! 1 that the limiting value R = 1, indicating the end of
the departure period, can never be reached.
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B.2 Optimum
The maximization in (22) is performed by writing out the arguments ofU
h bH (t) ;cW (t)i
in the integrand as functions of td = t  t0:
bH (tdjt0) = t0 + Z td
0
(1   s)H ds = t0 + 1
 
 1  (1   td)
H+1
H + 1
W (tdjt0) = 
  t1 + 1
 

Z 1= 
td
( s)W ds = 
  t0   1
 
+
1  ( td)W+1
W + 1
where now we have explicitly indicated in the notation that these arguments de-
pend on t0. (There is not carat on W when written as a function of td because,
conditional on t0, it is the same function as in the Nash equilibrium calculation.)
The average value of this utility is
U (t0) =  
Z 1= 
0
U
h bH (tdjt0) ;W (tdjt0)i dtd
and the first-order condition for maximizing it is
0 =
dU
dt0
=  
Z 1= 
0
UH
@ bH
@t0
dtd+ 
Z 1= 
0
UW
@W
@t0
dtd =  
Z 1= 
0
bHdtd  
Z 1= 
0
1
W
dtd
(33)
since @ bH=@t0 = 1 and @W=@t0 =  1. Intuitively, (33) states that t0 is in-
creased until the marginal benefit of increased home time, measured by UH , is
just matched by the marginal disbenefit of decreased work time, UW . The internal
dynamics, i.e. the shape of the departure pattern within the congested period, play
no role in this calculation because they are unaffected by changes in t0 given that
the toll has been adjusted to make this departure pattern simply a constant at rate
 .
B.3 Capacity expansion
The values of capacity expansion are given by (16) and (17), which here take the
forms:
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@ e
@ 
=
N
 2

H0 + W 1
@
@ 
=


t0
  1
W 0

@t0
@ 
+
1
W 0
N
 2
W
1 + W
where H0 and W 0 are the values taken by H and W for the first traveler, and W 1
is the value taken by W for the last traveler.
B.4 Practical issues
The simulations are actually performed with time measured in units of 2 hours.
Parameters and results with a time dimension are rescaled accordingly in present-
ing results: specifically, 
 and N=	 are simulated with values equal to one-half
the stated values, and all resulting times are inflated by a factor of 2. In addition,
the time universe [0;
] is taken to represent the interval [2:00 a.m., 12:00 noon] in
simulations #1-5, and [midnight, noon] in simulation #6; hence 2 hours are added
to clock time t0 when reporting results in simulations #1-5.
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